Divisions emerging in Europe over Ukraine conflict
By: Rachel Marsden
PARIS — It was inevitable that sooner or later, leading European countries 
would start distancing themselves from the aggressive rhetoric that has been the 
hallmark of the European Union leadership’s approach to the armed conflict in 
Ukraine.
Last week in Turin, Italian Prime Minister Luigi Di Maio presented a four-point 
peace plan to United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres, who made 
contact with Moscow and Kyiv in visits a few weeks ago. Di Maio also chaired the 
group of Europe’s foreign ministers at a meeting in Turin, including those of 
other EU countries which have recently shown interest in de-escalating the 
months-old debacle.
Recently, French President Emmanuel Macron has been criticized by Baltic state 
leaders for even picking up the phone to engage with Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, while German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was pressured to contribute to the 
irresponsible flood of weapons into Ukraine and slammed for not being 
sufficiently enthusiastic about doing so.
So now Di Maio has laid out a concrete exit strategy that may already enjoy 
quiet backing from some EU member states. First, there would be a ceasefire and 
demilitarization of the battle zones. Then enshrinement of neutrality for 
Ukraine with security guarantees. Thirdly, a bilateral agreement between Russia 
and Ukraine regarding the status of contested territories. And finally, an end 
to anti-Russian sanctions and a multilateral peace agreement between the EU and 
Russian which would no doubt have to take into account arms control in the wake 
of flooding the zone with weapons, which may have already reportedly made their 
way onto the black market.
It’s hardly surprising that some individual member states within the EU are 
seeking an off-ramp, even as the bloc’s unelected supranational leadership in 
Brussels ramps up the irresponsible rhetoric.
The most aggressive behavior in the western world has been exhibited by those 
with the least to lose from prolonging the conflict — politically, economically, 
or otherwise.
Washington’s recently approved $40 billion package for Ukraine that includes 
military, economic, and humanitarian support that will end up who knows where 
amid corruption and chaos suggests a long-term investment in promoting 
instability. But the various rounds of U.S. sanctions against Russia is telling 
as to how confident Washington feels that its economy is mostly sheltered from 
any related fallout. Clearly, the roughly 8 percent of overall U.S. supply of 
petroleum and oil products previously imported from Russia can be replaced by 
other sources from Mexico, Canada, South America, or West Africa, even though in 
some cases the increased shipping distance could bump up the cost, as the Wall 
Street Journal explained last month.
So when President Joe Biden sanctions Russian industry — energy or otherwise — 
there’s perhaps even a net future benefit for the U.S. through the urgency to 
establish greater North American energy independence (anti-pipeline 
anti-environmentalists be damned).
It’s slightly more puzzling why the UK is taking a hari-kari approach to the 
conflict by arguably going even further than the U.S. In prohibiting even 
British citizens and companies from offering business consulting services – 
including accounting and public relations – to Russian business entities, the UK 
isn’t really harming the Russian economy so much as its own by causing Russia to 
pivot to service providers from Europe, America or elsewhere.
Anti-Russian fervor in the UK is so misguided that even the Association of 
Tennis Professionals (ATP) and the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) decided on 
May 20 to strip the annual Wimbledon tennis tournament of its ranking points for 
participants — effectively reducing the competition to an exhibition match — as 
a result of the tournament’s decision to ban Russian and Belarusian players. 
You’d think that they were directly lobbing missiles into Ukraine with backhand 
serves.
Britain’s scorched earth approach to Russia suggests that it is either 
ideologically drunk to the point of economic recklessness, or else it figures 
that it can weather the storm. Britain’s National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research suggests that “the impact on the UK could be to reduce GDP 
growth by around 0.8 per cent to 4.0 per cent in 2022 and to 0.5 per cent in 
2023.” Meanwhile, British gas comes from the North Sea and Norway, with just 3 
percent imported from Russia (compared to 35 percent for the EU).
But it’s the EU that risks being hit hardest and is staring down the barrel of 
potential recession. Which would explain why despite EU Commission President 
Ursula von der Leyen’s vow to eventually ditch Russian energy, 20 EU companies 
supplying member states have opened accounts in rubles in order to continue 
buying gas from Russia’s Gazprom in light of the EU’s own anti-Russian 
sanctions.
Some EU member states know that their citizens are fed up with the chaos and are 
now taking the first tentative concrete steps toward peace. What remains to be 
seen is how much courage they have against ideological pressure from the U.S., 
UK, and EU leadership.
COPYRIGHT 2022 RACHEL MARSDEN