Have Intelligence Agencies Become Too Reliant On Technology?
By: Rachel Marsden
PARIS -- A newly leaked document stolen by former National Security Agency
contractor Edward Snowden last year reveals that one of the NSA's partner
agencies within the "Five Eyes" Anglo-intelligence network -- Britain's
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), responsible for signals
intelligence -- dedicated vast resources to fooling around on the Internet,
according to journalist Glenn Greenwald. The GCHQ has reportedly developed tools
capable of playing with the results of online polls; sending out spoof emails
and Microsoft Office documents that, once opened, can grab and transmit files
and info from a user's computer; collecting data from public profiles on
LinkedIn and other social-networking websites; and discreetly increasing website
traffic and rankings.
It's a troubling revelation, because it makes this very important government
agency appear no more distinguished than a 15-year old computer hacker. I don't
think British citizens are paying for that sort of thing.
We've all received emails purporting to be from our bank or email service
provider, with instructions to click legitimate-looking links that would no
doubt compromise our computer systems. If government intelligence services are
just getting into the same game now, then the lack of return on the intelligence
budget investment should be of more concern than the potential for abuse.
There are two possibilities. Either, as critics argue, these technical
intelligence agencies are interested in vacuuming up as much nonspecific data as
possible, regardless of whose data it is, or they are already employing these
methods and tactics in a targeted fashion. In both cases, their efforts are
misguided. Here's why.
If the general public is the target of volume collection, then it's like going
to the grocery store to buy eggs but instead spending days emptying all the
shelves. If an agency is spending that much time on everyone, there should be
legitimate concern about whether it's adequately drilling down to the actual
threats.
While intelligence agencies are busy playing with online polls and website
traffic rankings, how much targeting is actually happening? I'm much less
concerned about intelligence agencies scooping up information on random
innocents than I am about the extent to which agencies' initiatives are
effective on actual targets. No doubt satellite navigation systems have enabled
successful drone attacks against terrorists, for example, but that's just one
aspect of an entire defense system -- the one that we keep hearing about. What
other tools have proven useful?
Can the sort of technological initiatives revealed by the latest Snowden leak
produce an effective national security result, should the need ever arise? Is
there measurable proof of increased effectiveness commensurate with the
increased usage of these technological initiatives? Or are they just being
fobbed off as a poor substitute for critical thinking and human analysis?
Oddly enough, it's probably easier to justify budgetary increases by laying
claim to the creation of new technological programs, regardless of their proven
effectiveness, rather than pointing to tangible results of plots that were
foiled the boring, old-fashioned way.
These agencies appear to be concocting initiatives that suggest their targets
are technologically imbecilic and oblivious to concepts related to manipulation
and social engineering. The reality is anything but.
As reported by several EU member states in the latest European Union Terrorism
Situation and Trend Report, published by Europol, terrorist fundraising already
takes place in plain view on the Internet. Forget data trawling; only an astute
understanding of pretext and cover, plus specific political knowledge, could
enable the detection of what would otherwise look like benign "charity"
fundraising.
According to the report: "In most cases, calls for donations were published on
Internet sites and forums. In one counter-terrorism investigation, it was noted
that supposed humanitarian aid activities were promoted via Facebook. Monetary
donations were requested via an associated PayPal account. ... Raised funds are
moved by various means, including money remittance companies, hawala (Arabic for
'transfer') traders, and/or the use of anonymous ('bearer') or preloaded value
cards. The sale of prepaid phone cards has also been observed in the financing
of terrorist entities."
The Europol report dispels the notion that terror suspects would be
technologically inept enough to fall for government intelligence "honey traps"
and other such trickery: "An increased level of security awareness is evident
among extremists on the Internet. They have made use of commonly available
anonymisation software (e.g. TOR), encryption applications designed and
propagated by extremist groups (e.g. 'Mujahideen Secrets' and 'Asrar al-Dardashah')
and private chatrooms (e.g. Paltalk)."
There is no question that technology has its place in intelligence work and is
capable of enhancing human analysis and reasoning, but citizens must be able to
actually see the evidence of that enhancement. They need details of the actual
successes, such as the identities of apprehended or eliminated targets. They
need explanations of how the technology proved to be of value (adequately
redacted for national security purposes, of course).
Otherwise, when these types of documents leak out into the public domain,
intelligence agencies are left trying to explain to taxpayers why they're
investing in the ability to fudge online polls and play with website statistics.
To be frank, it makes it sound as if government intelligence agencies are one
step away from spending their days playing Angry Birds.
COPYRIGHT 2014 RACHEL MARSDEN