Have Intelligence Agencies Become Too Reliant On Technology?
By: Rachel Marsden
PARIS -- A newly leaked document stolen by former National Security Agency 
contractor Edward Snowden last year reveals that one of the NSA's partner 
agencies within the "Five Eyes" Anglo-intelligence network -- Britain's 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), responsible for signals 
intelligence -- dedicated vast resources to fooling around on the Internet, 
according to journalist Glenn Greenwald. The GCHQ has reportedly developed tools 
capable of playing with the results of online polls; sending out spoof emails 
and Microsoft Office documents that, once opened, can grab and transmit files 
and info from a user's computer; collecting data from public profiles on 
LinkedIn and other social-networking websites; and discreetly increasing website 
traffic and rankings.
It's a troubling revelation, because it makes this very important government 
agency appear no more distinguished than a 15-year old computer hacker. I don't 
think British citizens are paying for that sort of thing.
We've all received emails purporting to be from our bank or email service 
provider, with instructions to click legitimate-looking links that would no 
doubt compromise our computer systems. If government intelligence services are 
just getting into the same game now, then the lack of return on the intelligence 
budget investment should be of more concern than the potential for abuse.
There are two possibilities. Either, as critics argue, these technical 
intelligence agencies are interested in vacuuming up as much nonspecific data as 
possible, regardless of whose data it is, or they are already employing these 
methods and tactics in a targeted fashion. In both cases, their efforts are 
misguided. Here's why.
If the general public is the target of volume collection, then it's like going 
to the grocery store to buy eggs but instead spending days emptying all the 
shelves. If an agency is spending that much time on everyone, there should be 
legitimate concern about whether it's adequately drilling down to the actual 
threats.
While intelligence agencies are busy playing with online polls and website 
traffic rankings, how much targeting is actually happening? I'm much less 
concerned about intelligence agencies scooping up information on random 
innocents than I am about the extent to which agencies' initiatives are 
effective on actual targets. No doubt satellite navigation systems have enabled 
successful drone attacks against terrorists, for example, but that's just one 
aspect of an entire defense system -- the one that we keep hearing about. What 
other tools have proven useful?
Can the sort of technological initiatives revealed by the latest Snowden leak 
produce an effective national security result, should the need ever arise? Is 
there measurable proof of increased effectiveness commensurate with the 
increased usage of these technological initiatives? Or are they just being 
fobbed off as a poor substitute for critical thinking and human analysis?
Oddly enough, it's probably easier to justify budgetary increases by laying 
claim to the creation of new technological programs, regardless of their proven 
effectiveness, rather than pointing to tangible results of plots that were 
foiled the boring, old-fashioned way.
These agencies appear to be concocting initiatives that suggest their targets 
are technologically imbecilic and oblivious to concepts related to manipulation 
and social engineering. The reality is anything but.
As reported by several EU member states in the latest European Union Terrorism 
Situation and Trend Report, published by Europol, terrorist fundraising already 
takes place in plain view on the Internet. Forget data trawling; only an astute 
understanding of pretext and cover, plus specific political knowledge, could 
enable the detection of what would otherwise look like benign "charity" 
fundraising.
According to the report: "In most cases, calls for donations were published on 
Internet sites and forums. In one counter-terrorism investigation, it was noted 
that supposed humanitarian aid activities were promoted via Facebook. Monetary 
donations were requested via an associated PayPal account. ... Raised funds are 
moved by various means, including money remittance companies, hawala (Arabic for 
'transfer') traders, and/or the use of anonymous ('bearer') or preloaded value 
cards. The sale of prepaid phone cards has also been observed in the financing 
of terrorist entities."
The Europol report dispels the notion that terror suspects would be 
technologically inept enough to fall for government intelligence "honey traps" 
and other such trickery: "An increased level of security awareness is evident 
among extremists on the Internet. They have made use of commonly available 
anonymisation software (e.g. TOR), encryption applications designed and 
propagated by extremist groups (e.g. 'Mujahideen Secrets' and 'Asrar al-Dardashah') 
and private chatrooms (e.g. Paltalk)."
There is no question that technology has its place in intelligence work and is 
capable of enhancing human analysis and reasoning, but citizens must be able to 
actually see the evidence of that enhancement. They need details of the actual 
successes, such as the identities of apprehended or eliminated targets. They 
need explanations of how the technology proved to be of value (adequately 
redacted for national security purposes, of course).
Otherwise, when these types of documents leak out into the public domain, 
intelligence agencies are left trying to explain to taxpayers why they're 
investing in the ability to fudge online polls and play with website statistics. 
To be frank, it makes it sound as if government intelligence agencies are one 
step away from spending their days playing Angry Birds.
COPYRIGHT 2014 RACHEL MARSDEN